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The Flipside of Discovery
planned pueblo indian response to the approach of the
coronado expedition
Richard Flint

S

ixteenth-century European-led expeditions of reconnaissance and
conquest in the New World involved the reciprocal discovery of Natives
by “explorers” and of “explorers” by Natives.1 European “explorers” accumulated intelligence and devised stratagems for contact with Natives; and they
recorded these endeavors in their own accounts. The records left by those
same “explorers” also reveal parallel planning by Native Americans for their
encounters with the Europeans. One such instance of Natives discovering
“explorers” took place in the American Southwest, or New Spain’s far north,
in the early 1540s. The “explorers” were the members of the Coronado Expedition, and the Natives were the Pueblo Indians of what are today Arizona
and New Mexico.

Richard Flint is a historian of colonial Latin America and U.S. western history. He is a graduate
of St. John’s College in Santa Fe, holds an MA from New Mexico Highlands University, and
earned a PhD in history at the University of New Mexico. For more than thirty years, his principal topic of research has been the Coronado Expedition of 1539–1542. His most recent books
are No Settlement, No Conquest: A History of the Coronado Entrada (Albuquerque: University
of New Mexico Press, 2008) and The Latest Word from 1540: People, Places, and Portrayals of
the Coronado Expedition, edited with Shirley Cushing Flint (Albuquerque: University of New
Mexico Press, 2011). The Flints are currently engaged in a seven-year prosopographical research
project. They are now analyzing the data about members of the Coronado Expedition gathered
during the project and are working toward publishing their findings in a print and digital publication tentatively titled A Most Splendid Company: People of the Coronado Expedition, to be
published cooperatively by the University of New Mexico Press and the Center for Southwest
Research at UNM’s Zimmerman Library.

1

2 N new mexico historical review

volume 88, number 1

A week or so past the summer solstice of 1540, a large heterogeneous cavalcade of people and animals, the advance guard of the Coronado Expedition,
crossed what we now know as the Gila River in southwestern New Mexico.
The expeditionaries’ records give no indication that they knew they had also
crossed a territorial boundary or were being watched. In fact, the members
of the Coronado Expedition labeled the territory they were now entering a
despoblado, an unsettled land without evidence of permanent human presence. They had, however, just entered the territory of the Ashiwi, known
today as the Zuni Indians.2
Unbeknownst to the thousand or so Europeans of various nationalities,
black African slaves and servants, and Indian allies from at least a dozen tribal
homelands in Mexico who made up the advance guard of the expedition,
the Ashiwi monitored their every move. The Ashiwi reported the Europeans
activities up and down the Native trade trail that the expedition was being
guided along. The expedition stimulated intense interest by local populations
because it was a very large group with a dangerous reputation.3
The members of the Coronado Expedition assumed that they were alone
and unnoticed as they crossed the relatively rough terrain of river drainages
and adjacent wooded foothills that stretch for 150 miles or so between the
Gila and Zuni rivers.4 But lookouts from Shíwana were secretly surveying
their movements. The lookouts apparently operated in relays, one group
returning to Shíwana with reports after being replaced by another.
Two weeks later, upon reaching the Zuni River, the expeditionaries finally
spied two of the lookouts racing in the direction of their home pueblo. Four
other men, probably the replacements of the previous group of lookouts,
openly approached the expedition and said “they were there because they
had been sent to that unsettled place to tell us we were welcome.”5 Soon
thereafter, two more Ashiwi contacted the advance guard, who gave them
and the four earlier representatives from Shíwana trade goods and told them
to tell their people to stay in their homes without fear. The expeditionaries,
though, were extremely wary of the Ashiwi. As one of the expeditionaries,
Pedro de Ledesma, later put it, “The Indians wandered about looking over
the army like men who had come to see what people were in the camp and
how they were organized.”6 They acted like spies, and indeed, none of the
Ashiwi returned to the expedition’s camp, suggesting that their mission had
been reconnaissance rather than a social visit.
The lookouts carried each batch of news back to Shíwana and shared
it with the seven pueblos, especially among the governing councils that
regulated life in each town. Each council conferred among its own members
about each new bit of intelligence in light of what they already knew about the
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foreigners. Then the councils consulted with each other to set a coordinated
response to the approaching menace.7
What the Ashiwi knew about the Coronado Expedition was considerable,
even before it arrived on their doorstep. For years the Ashiwi had been hearing
about Spanish activities far to their south. As the expedition’s captain general,
Francisco Vázquez de Coronado, later recorded, the Ashiwi “assert that it
was said among them more than fifty years ago that a people like us must
come, from the direction we have come, and that they would subjugate this
whole land.”8 Extensive indigenous trade, travel, and information networks
had stitched together Native America for thousands of years and were fully
functional in 1540. Even over distances of many hundreds of miles, those
networks were capable of transmitting information and eyewitness accounts,
sometimes even eyewitnesses themselves, with remarkable speed.9 To give an
indication of both the reach and velocity of indigenous information networks,
here is a case that relates directly to the Coronado Expedition.
About two months after the arrival of the advance guard at the Zuni River,
the seaborne unit of the expedition under Hernando de Alarcón was making
slow, towed progress up the lower reaches of the Gila River just above its junction with the Colorado River. Alarcón and his men were nearly 350 miles as
the crow flies from Cíbola and much farther away by any feasible land route.
Nevertheless, Alarcón met and interviewed a local Gila River Native who had
talked with others recently returned from Shíwana. The men who had been to
Shíwana recounted the arrival of the advance guard of the expedition, which
they had witnessed. Thus, less than two months after the expedition’s arrival at
Shíwana/Cíbola, news of the event was common knowledge among Indians
along the lower Gila River, hundreds of miles away.10
The Ashiwi had for centuries been hearing stories of the Mexica, Purépecha, and other Indians of Mesoamerica, who were known far and wide
because of their fearsome practice of ritualized warfare and sacrifice of prisoners.11 By a similar means of long distance communication, they may have
heard about the cataclysmic events of the conquest of Tenochtitlan under
Hernando Cortés in 1521. Almost certainly they had heard about Spaniards
crossing to the Pacific coast of Mexico in 1523 and their bloody northward
thrust as far as Culiacán between 1529 and 1531. By the middle 1530s, Spanish
slaving raids had reached southern Sonora in modern Mexico. The Ashiwi
undoubtedly heard about the raids from regular visitors who traveled from
Sonora to Shíwana at least once a year. People in central Sonora had told fray
Marcos de Niza in 1539, the year before the Coronado Expedition’s advance
guard passed through, that they “were accustomed to travel to the ciudad of
Cíbola in thirty days of travel” to work in the fields there every year.12
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In 1539 the Ashiwi had their first direct contact with an Old World native,
the Moorish slave named Esteban. He arrived at the pueblo of Hawikku, one
of the seven ciudades of Shíwana, known to the expeditionaries as Cíbola, in
the company of about three hundred Indians from Sonora and southeastern
Arizona. In response to questions from leaders at Shíwana, Esteban told them
that “behind [him] were coming two white men.” The white men sounded
like some of the conquistadores and slavers the Ashiwi had heard about for
years from their Sonoran friends. They concluded that Esteban was a “spy
or guide for some people who were trying to conquer them”—not far from
the truth—so they killed him.13
After Esteban’s death, the Ashiwi sent word south to the Natives of southeastern Arizona that “if Christians came, they were to consider them of no
importance and were to kill them, since they were mortal . . . [and] if they did
not dare to kill [the Spaniards], they were to send [a messenger] to tell [the
people of Shíwana], because they would come to do it right.”14 Sending such
a message to their neighbors indicates that deliberation within the governing councils at Shíwana in 1539 had already reached a consensus about the
nature of the Europeans slowly but relentlessly approaching them from the
south. It also indicates that the Ashiwi had already resolved to oppose them.
By the time the Coronado Expedition’s advance guard reached the Zuni
River, little more than a year later, the Ashiwi had already been thinking
about, discussing, and planning for the arrival of a group like them for years.
That planning was based on specific detailed information that came in part
from a Sonoran Indian named Bartolomé, a companion of Esteban who
had remained in Shíwana after the Moor’s death. The expedition’s captain
general later wrote: “[The people of Shíwana] took [Bartolomé] prisoner and
have held him closely guarded up till now. When I tried to get him back,
they refused to give him up for two or three days, saying that he was dead.
And other times [they said] that the Indians of Acucu had led him away. But
finally, when I told them I would become extremely angry, if they did not
give him to me, they turned him over to me.”15
Because of reports Bartolomé gave, supplementing news from their
southern neighbors and recent reports from their own lookouts, the Ashiwi
knew about horses, guns, and the Mexican Indian allies who accompanied
the expedition. Some had actually seen expeditionaries, but everyone in
Shíwana had at least heard detailed descriptions of them. Thus, the size,
speed, and effectiveness of horses as vehicles of war were no surprise to the
Ashiwi. The same was true of guns, crossbows, metal armor, bugles, drums,
banners, and other European accoutrements of war. Indians had already
received pictures of such items, both drawn and verbal. As anthropologist
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Michael Wilcox has recently written, “Pueblos had formulated (through
communication networks) a collective portrait of how the Spaniards could
be expected to behave.”16
The Ashiwi, like many other contemporary Native Americans, saw the
Spaniards’ horses as their most potent threat. Ashiwi tactics, both offensive
and defensive, revolved around hurting horses to minimize their effectiveness.
This focus was particularly apparent on the night of 16 July 1540. Following
the advance guard’s arrival at the Zuni River earlier that day, the expedition’s
maestre de campo scouted ahead upstream, toward the towns of Shíwana,
perhaps forewarned by Sonoran or Arizonan Indians with the advance guard.
The scouts soon returned to the main camp to report the existence of a “dangerous pass,” a narrow canyon formed by the Zuni River as it cut through a
sandstone mesa.17 In light of that news, Vázquez de Coronado directed García
López de Cárdenas and twenty or thirty horsemen to occupy that pass and
guard it during the night. They did so, taking up positions among boulders
in the canyon.
As Vázquez de Coronado later reported, “When a quarter of the second
watch was over, Indians struck and shot some horses with arrows.” None of
the men-at-arms were wounded, only horses, suggesting that horses were,
in fact, the target of the attack. The Ashiwi also set up a howl, unnerving
both men and horses. Mounts reared and some riders threw their saddles on
backward. When the expeditionaries roused and got themselves mounted,
the Ashiwi warriors melted into the night, dark after moonset.18 Their attack
at the dangerous pass clearly reveals the Ashiwi’s concern over horses, based
on years of alarm expressed by neighbors and two weeks of direct observation
by their own lookouts.
In the wake of the nighttime raid, the whole advance guard of the expedition came together at the pass the next morning. With drums and trumpets
sounding and banners waving, they proceeded upstream toward Hawikku, the
most southwesterly of the Cíbola/Shíwana pueblos. Vázquez de Coronado
wrote afterward that as the advance guard moved toward Hawikku, “From
time to time the Indians sent up their smoke clouds, which were answered
from a distance with as much coordination as we would have known how
to do ourselves. Thus, they were notified that we were traveling and where
we had reached.”19 As a consequence, as many as two hundred warriors were
arrayed to meet them in front of the pueblo. They were armed and in full
regalia.
Vázquez de Coronado “sent maestre de campo don García López, fray
Daniel, fray Luis, and Fernando Bermejo[, a scribe,] some distance ahead with
some horsemen, so that the Indians might see them. [He ordered them] to tell
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[the Indians] that [the purpose of their] coming was not to do them injury,
but to protect them in the name of the emperor.”20 In response, the Ashiwi
shot an arrow into the skirts of fray Luis’s cassock. As the rest of the advance
guard took up positions alongside the friars, more arrows were unleashed,
and the warriors moved closer to the foreigners, clearly testing their reaction.
Finally, Vázquez de Coronado gave the word to attack, and mounted lancers
raced forward, overtaking and killing several Natives before the rest could
scale the outer walls of the stone pueblo, using ladders they had left there
for that purpose.
The Ashiwi warriors pulled up all but one of the ladders behind them,
setting a trap for anyone who followed. Vázquez de Coronado took the bait.
As the captain general later wrote, “The people who were on the roof defending themselves had no difficulty at all inflicting the injury on us that they
had power [to do].” Immediately leading an assault on the pueblo, Vázquez
de Coronado, one of the few men who wore a suit of armor, rushed to the
single remaining ladder and began to climb. Ashiwi warriors promptly appeared at the head of the ladder and bombarded the captain general with
stones, including a heavy grinding stone that dented his helmet and knocked
him unconscious to the ground. He was saved from certain death by two of
his captains who shielded him with their bodies and then carried him, still
unconscious, out of the fray.21
The Ashiwi watched this withdrawal and may have expected that the
apparent death of the most prominent man from the expedition might end
the assault. Instead, it resumed under the leadership of López de Cárdenas.
The Ashiwi warriors now engaged the expeditionaries only from the cover
of massive pueblo walls and the elevation of its flat roofs. After an hour or
so, the pueblo grew quiet and it became obvious to the expeditionaries that
it now was empty. The Ashiwi defenders had let themselves down the back
wall and withdrawn surreptitiously to Dowa Yalanne, a steep-walled mesa
about fifteen miles away.22
Upon entering the deserted pueblo, the expeditionaries realized that the
Ashiwi had carefully planned and orchestrated the battle. The Ashiwi had
been testing and studying the foreigners’ tactics and martial skill. Prior to the
beginning of hostilities, probably several days before, the pueblo “had been
cleared of men older than sixty years and younger than twenty [years] and
of women and children. All that remained were fighting men.”23 The Ashiwi
had also transferred nearly all of the pueblo’s moveable goods and furnishings to a defensive site on Dowa Yalanne. Shortly after the battle, Vázquez
de Coronado wrote, “I think they have turquoise in quantity. By the time I
arrived, this had disappeared, along with the rest of their possessions, except
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the corn.”24 Given their hunger, the expeditionaries ravenously consumed a
portion of the corn.
The recounted events from 15 to 17 July 1540 are best conceived as a series
of probing encounters on both the Ashiwi and expeditionary sides. Each
party had adhered to an overarching strategy.25 The Ashiwi strategy was to
observe and test firsthand the strength and skill of the foreigners. The brief
skirmishes confirmed for the Ashiwi that the expedition’s mounted lancers
and large cohort of Mexican Indian allies were extremely potent forces. The
Ashiwi had faith that in one-on-one combat—the kind that the Mexican
Indians preferred—Ashiwi warriors could best their Mexican adversaries.
Equestrian advantage could be neutralized by choosing locations of confrontation that were steep and rugged. Thus, in advance of the first battle, they
had established their fall-back defense on the high and vertical-walled mesa
of Dowa Yalanne. This strategy of defensive withdrawal was nothing new. It
was a common prehistoric reaction to outside encroachment, now pursued
in response to new threats.26
Once they decided to defend themselves from the height of Dowa Yalanne,
the Ashiwi successfully stuck with that strategy. They kept “their wives and
children and all the goods they have in their fortified places.”27 Throughout
the nearly two years the Coronado Expedition remained in Tierra Nueva
(the American Southwest), the Ashiwi of Hawikku never returned en masse
to their valley pueblo. Word of this strategy’s success spread to other Pueblo
people of the region: the Tiwa, Tewa, Tano, Towa, Keres, and Hopi. With
only one exception a few days after the battle at Hawikku, none of the Pueblos
challenged the Coronado Expedition on flat, open terrain again. Instead,
they removed themselves to strongly fortified buildings, almost always on
commanding elevations. This minimized the number of violent assaults
and casualties suffered by the Pueblos during the residence of the Coronado
Expedition. Even so, historians have estimated the death rate from violence
among the Tiwas, the most affected Pueblo group during residence of the
Coronado Expedition, at more than ten percent.28
The Pueblos repeatedly used this strategy of defensive withdrawal from
valley pueblos in favor of elevated locations during the Coronado Expedition and subsequent expeditions of the sixteenth century, as well as during
the Pueblo-Spanish War of 1692–1696.29 Castañeda de Nájera referred to this
tactic when he reported on a sortie north along the Rio Grande late in the
summer of 1541. He explained that when an expeditionary company under
Francisco Barrionuevo reached the Tewa pueblos near the junction of the
Rio Grande and Rio Chama, the company found that the people of “Yuque
Yunque [had] abandoned two very beautiful pueblos, between which was
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the river, and went to the mountain chain where they had four very strong
pueblos in rugged land.”30
The Pueblos elaborated that strategy with several complementary measures. First, the Pueblos, to the extent they could, strictly limited contact
with the expedition to specialists whose customary responsibility was external
relations. Within days of the abandonment and occupation of Hawikku, for
example, a group of Pueblo emissaries arrived there from Cicuique (Pecos
Pueblo), two hundred miles to the east. They had heard about the arrival
of foreigners through word spread along the communication grid. With all
the studied speech and gestures of seasoned diplomats, they made a show of
marveling at the troop of foreigners and offered their services as guides to the
expeditionaries. They would be pleased, they said, to conduct them through
the Rio Grande pueblos, “making sure that the Indians of those pueblos came
out in peace with clothing and provisions and welcomed [the Spaniards] very
well.”31 The expeditionaries accepted the arrangement, and the leader of the
Pueblo delegation, a man the Spaniards called Bigotes, traveled in advance
of an expeditionary detachment to the Rio Grande. Although the Pueblos’
reception of the foreigners there was not without incident, on the whole the
Europeans were pleased with how smoothly things went.32
Second, the embassy from Cicuique, with the acquiescence of the members of the Coronado Expedition, dictated the itinerary and pace by which the
expeditionaries saw Tierra Nueva. The Native guides orchestrated ceremonial
welcomes and controlled the information upon which the expedition’s travel
plans were based. Bigotes supplied another guide, called El Turco by the
Spaniards, who told tales of “very large settlements and also gold, silver, and
painted pictures” at a place known as Quivira.33
The expedition then spent the summer months the following year chasing
Quivira, El Turco’s quimera. But both before and after that long and fruitless
journey, the Pueblos maintained their defensive distance from the expedition and “never consented to peace.”34 The expedition and the Indians had
minimal contact and, though sporadic, the violence was bloody. The most
protracted fighting occurred at a strong and elevated fortified pueblo called
Moho, a location fully consistent with the Pueblos’ strategy of defensive
withdrawal.35
In the spring of 1542, the expeditionaries, faced with recalcitrant and distant
Pueblo neighbors, a climate of hot and cold extremes, severely disappointed
expectations, and a mammoth uprising behind them in Mexico, elected to
abandon the long shot in Tierra Nueva, cut their losses, and return south.
Two major factors in this decision were persistent Pueblo self-segregation
and noncooperation. Pueblo strategies, it must be said, were sometimes
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facilitated by vacillation of the expeditionaries between outbursts of violence
and attempts at “peaceful occupation.”36
European Discoveries and Pueblo Knowledge
The Pueblo strategies of defensive withdrawal from the Coronado Expedition into rugged terrain and restriction of contact with the expedition to
formal interchange by outside chiefs were highly successful. Those two
strategies severely limited what the European-led force saw and where it
traveled while in Tierra Nueva. Further, combined with two extremely cold
winters in a row and the disappointing lack of high-value goods among the
Pueblos, defensive disengagement and limited diplomatic contact ensured
that the expedition would make no settlement in Tierra Nueva. Withdrawal
deprived the expedition of cooperative guides, and those guides were key to
where the expeditionaries went and what they saw. The European members
of the expedition were not explorers in the strictest sense of the word. While
they traveled to where none of their compatriots had ever been before, they
were not blazers of trails across utterly virgin lands. Instead, they relied on
local residents to lead them to population centers, traveling by established
roads and trails to places known far and wide among the Native populations.
When guides were absent or led grudgingly, the expeditionaries frequently
found themselves frustrated. When in August 1540, for example, an expeditionary detachment was led to the Grand Canyon, its Hopi guides feigned
ignorance of how to reach the Colorado River at the bottom of the canyon.
The expeditionaries tried randomly and fruitlessly to climb down to the
river. Earlier, from Shíwana/Cíbola, Vázquez de Coronado wrote to the
Spanish viceroy in Mexico City that he could not provide a description of
Pueblo women’s clothing because “the Indians keep [the women] so carefully guarded [at their refuge on Dowa Yalanne] that until now I have seen
no more than two elderly women.”37
Furthermore, when guides chose to ignore, bypass, or conceal communities or features, the expeditionaries never suspected they existed. For instance,
none of the surviving contemporaneous documents indicates that the expedition visited or even heard about most of the Tompiro/Salinas pueblos that
were then flourishing in the Estancia and northern Tularosa basins, east of
the Rio Grande and southeast of Tiguex. That ignorance meant that the
expeditionaries were also unaware of the series of salt lakes in the Estancia
Basin, which had been exploited for centuries by the Pueblos and were
later recognized as a major resource once a Spanish colony was successfully
established in New Mexico in the 1590s.
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Given frequent attention paid to turquoise in documents of the expedition, it is surprising that the expeditionaries had no knowledge of the major
turquoise mines that were then being worked by the Pueblos in the Cerrillos
Hills east of the Rio Grande at the northern edge of the Galisteo Basin. That
was true despite repeated traffic by expeditionaries with Pueblo guides back
and forth across the basin almost within eyesight of the mines. Likewise, the
newcomers were kept in the dark about the locations of sources of lead from
which the Pueblos extracted material used in glazing ceramics. This pattern
of ignorance of mineral resources by the expedition suggests a concerted,
coordinated, and successful effort by Pueblo people of various linguistic and
political affiliations to keep such information to themselves.
Fray Marcos de Niza pointedly mentioned having been told by Indians
in 1539 about two large and prosperous Native polities called Totonteac and
Marata. When they arrived in Tierra Nueva the following year, members of
the expedition asked various Native people about those places, but apparently
made no attempt to physically verify their existence after their guides told
them that neither place matched the friar’s report. The Spanish response
suggests that either the Pueblos were very insistent and convincing in their
denial of knowledge or the expeditionaries were undemanding in their inquiry.
The hostility, including the passive hostility that characterized most extended
relations between the expedition and Pueblo communities, further reduced
contact between the expedition and the Pueblos and other indigenous peoples
of Tierra Nueva. What contact they did have was either very violent or occurred
in carefully controlled exchanges with messengers and emissaries. Therefore,
central aspects of Pueblo life, such as religious ceremonies and trade with
neighbors and distant partners, were unwitnessed and utterly unknown to the
newcomers. Not a single description from the Coronado Expedition’s surviving
documentary record reports the Pueblos’ busy annual cycle of masked dances
or of the conspicuous, elaborately costumed dancers themselves. Evidently,
members of the expedition did not see them. Nor is there any mention of foreign traders, either singly or in parties, making what are known to have been
routine visits to the pueblos of the Rio Grande region, where the expedition
was in residence for more than twelve full months.
In short, members of the expedition had only a narrow and restricted view
of the land of Tierra Nueva and, more importantly, the people who inhabited
it, the king’s potential vassals. Expeditionaries’ attitudes toward and decisions
about the people of the region were circumscribed by the physical limits of
what they saw and by what they were permitted to see by their guides and
other members of the Native communities, which was determined in large
measure by the defensive strategies of the region’s Native people.
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Such tunnel vision is, of course, part of the human condition and not a
disability peculiar to sixteenth-century Europeans. The indigenous people
of Tierra Nueva had a similarly truncated vision. The Coronado Expedition
presented to them an anomalous, artificially unbalanced society made up
predominantly of young men. To all appearances, it was a community almost
devoid of elders, women, and young children, especially girls, and thus incapable of reproducing itself. As a consequence, the expedition seemed to be
without any but the most rudimentary domesticity. It looked to be a group
incapable of feeding itself, except with meat, bent on forcing its way across
the continent for alien reasons.
The more constructive aspects of Old World cultures were almost completely hidden from the Indians of Tierra Nueva in what they saw of the
Coronado Expedition. Even the Franciscan priests and friars accompanying
the expedition made little impression on the Native population, having limited opportunity for contact with indigenous people other than as auxiliary
support to the armed majority of the expedition. Certainly, there was next to
no opportunity for religious indoctrination or proselytization.38 The expedition seemed like a malevolent force to be hidden from, chased away, and, if
one dared, enlisted briefly for one’s own cause.
One effect of such a view was that Pueblo and other Native groups rejected and destroyed elements of expeditionary culture and material, even
when they might have been of potential use and value in the Indian world.
Horses, for example, were killed rather than employed as transportation or
pack animals. Likewise, there is no evidence in written, archaeological, or
oral Native accounts that at this time Indians took advantage of the docility and manageability of sheep, goats, or cattle. Such animals were simply
slaughtered immediately for food or destroyed as enemy possessions.
Partial knowledge on all sides of the constellation of Old World natives
and natives of Tierra Nueva made for a signal case of what historian James
Lockhart has rightly called “double mistaken identity.”39 Probably no other
outcome was realistically possible. Because of information received earlier,
the parties were polarized, with little reason to exchange extensive information about each other or to allow each other to acquire such knowledge
independently. In the absence of extended peaceful contact, both sides were
doomed to remain a mystery to each other.
The Pueblos’ initial strategies of defensive withdrawal and minimal intercourse had short-term operational success and staved off colonial occupation
for sixty years. But, ultimately, a modified strategy—one of sustained, if still
limited, contact with Europeans, resulting in increasing familiarity—ensured
eventual coexistence of the two groups.
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